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Abstract 
Managing disasters is a complex and dynamic task. Collaboration between emergency 
agencies is commonly reported to be the weakness in disaster mitigation. The purpose of this 
article is to explore situation awareness (SA) in relation to ICT-use, expertise, and workload, 
factors that are previously found to influence SA. The online questionnaire used to gather data 
in a Norwegian collaboration exercise setting consisted of SART, NASA-TLX, and 
demographical questions. The data analysis revealed that task/system factors, such as the use 
of multiple ICT-devices and in particular the use of mobile phone, were associated with 
higher SA in the present exercise. Expertise, which is an individual factor, did not reveal any 
connection to SA. Further, the role of respondents was found to be a moderating factor in the 
relationship between SA and workload. The results of this study provide an insight in the field 
of disaster management and contribute to an increased understanding of the interaction 
between SA, ICT-use, expertise and workload in this domain.  
  
SITUATION AWARENESS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 2 
Situation Awareness in Disaster Management: A Study of a Norwegian Collaboration 
Exercise 
Disaster mitigation has been a persevering topic for a long time (std.meld. nr. 29 
(2012-2013), 2014). The local terrorist attack at Oslo and Utøya (2011) and other 
international catastrophes (e.g. the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010) render research in this area highly relevant. There is 
no universally accepted definition of term disaster, and terms like disaster, crisis and 
emergency are often used interchangeably (Shaluf & Said, 2003). According to Boin and Hart 
(2010), all these terms refer to a large-scale, threatening, urgent and uncertainty-filled 
disruption of the status quo in a community or organisation. The United Nations Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction from 2013 states that economic losses from 
disasters during the last three years have soared past $100 billion (UNISDR, 2013). 
Ultimately, disaster management is not only about reducing the cost of disasters; it is about 
saving lives and contributing to a safe society. As stated by Waugh and Streib (2006): 
“modern disaster management presents a paradox: on one hand, emergency response requires 
meticulous organisation and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous” (p.132). 
Research on disaster management is essential in order to find solutions for disaster mitigation 
that take into account this paradox, as well as accumulate knowledge and lessons learned from 
previous disruptions. 
Disaster management is often characterized by a shared authority, dispersed 
responsibility, and resources that are scattered across large geographical areas. Achieving 
situation awareness has repeatedly proved to be a critical commodity in collaborative 
environments (Bolstad & Endsley, 2003, Shu and Furuta 2005, Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & 
Jenkins, 2009). Situation awareness (SA) is a term given to the level of awareness that an 
individual has of a situation, or merely the understanding of “what’s going on” (Endsley, 
1995b). Maintaining SA is often a key to success, especially in dynamic situations that require 
rapid decision-making. Failure to achieve SA can lead to catastrophic events such as the USS 
Vincennes accident (Endsley, 1995b), where an Iranian civilian passenger aircraft was shot 
down by an American missile cruiser. The decision maker in this accident made a correct 
decision (if hostile, warn off and then shoot down if warning is ignored), yet his SA was poor, 
which contributed to an incorrect perception of the incoming aircraft as hostile.  
Efficient disaster mitigation is dependent on collaboration between people from the 
emergency rescue services, voluntary organisations, actors from the industry, municipality, 
and external expert organisations. Collaboration includes working to achieve common goals, 
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and all types of collaboration include information sharing between the involved parties 
(Robinson & Gaddis, 2012). Reports from recent disasters suggest poor collaboration between 
emergency rescue agencies (NOU: 2012: 14). As identified in previous research, multi-agency 
collaboration can be improved by focusing on three aspects: establishing and maintaining 
shared SA, efficient communication across emergency agencies, and achieving adequate 
organizational understanding (Eide, Haugstveit & Halvorsrud, 2012).  
The term situation awareness is seemingly easy to comprehend; it refers to the degree 
of a person’s awareness or understanding of the situation. Research on the topic identifies 
many mechanisms in apprehending a given situation that are not easily accounted for (Garbis 
& Artman, 2004). Different external and internal factors influence the achieving and 
maintaining SA (Endsley, 1995b). Vaitkunas-Kalita, Landry and Yoo (2011) have discovered 
large differences in the use of the term situation awareness by scientific users and non-
professionals. Consequently, many attempts to define, explain and measure SA have taken 
place, and no unified and consensual theory has been established.  
The aim of the current paper is to explore SA in disaster management through factors 
that influence SA, based on a Norwegian collaboration exercise. A summary of the SA 
research field will be followed by the presentation of the factors that influence SA, which will 
be summarized and then tested empirically.  
Theoretical Approaches to SA 
SA has become a popular term within academic circles since the 1990s. Significant 
research contributions on SA have been made to the following domains: safety (Jackson, 
Chapman, & Crundall, 2009; Stanton, Walker, Young, Kazi, & Salmon, 2007), automation 
(Merat, Jamson, Lai, & Carsten, 2012; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008; Stanton & 
Young, 2005), aviation (Lancaster & Casali, 2008), air traffic control (Remington, Johnston, 
Ruthruff, Gold, & Romera, 2000; Sethumadhavan & Durso, 2009), military (Bryant & Smith, 
2013); and healthcare (Luz et al., 2013; Wauben et al., 2011). SA originated in the military 
research during World War I (Stanton, Chambers, & Piggott, 2001), and has become one of 
the key factors in contemporary disaster management (Hagen, Poudyal Chhetri, & Steiner, 
2013).  
According to Stanton, Salmon, Walker, and Jenkins (2010), SA can be assessed 
through the lens of three different schools of thought. A psychological approach refers to SA 
as something residing “in-mind” of an individual. An engineering approach refers to the 
phenomenon as situated ‘in-world’ (e.g. in displays and measurement tools). At last, an “in-
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interaction” approach combines the fields of human factors and ergonomics, and claims that 
SA is the result of an interaction between an individual and its environment. Each of these 
disciplines places a different emphasis on the concept of what SA is and how it manifests 
itself. Furthermore, SA can be assessed on a different levels of analysis; an individual- or a 
group-level of analysis. 
Individual SA.  Endsley (1988) advocates the “in-mind” approach and defines SA as 
“the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 97). 
SA is understood as a product of a situation assessment, which is a three level process 
incorporated in the cognitive processing of an individual (see figure 1). Endsley’s three-level 
model consists of perception (e.g. perceive smoke), comprehension (understand its meaning) 
and projection (predict future outcomes of the action) (Endsley, 1995b). The model has its 
theoretical foundation in information processing theory and the recognition-primed decision 
(RPD) model (Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989). The basic mechanisms that constitute 
SA are short-term sensory memory, perception, working memory, and long-term memory. 
The organisation of long-term memory is based on mental models, which are defined as “the 
mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, 
explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future 
system states” (Rouse & Morris, 1986, p.7-8). It is evident that the definition of SA is highly 
based on the definition of mental models. 
SA is affected by a person’s goals and expectations, which influence the direction of 
attention, the information perception and interpretation (Endsley, 1995b). The model shows 
that external and internal factors influence situation assessment, decision-making, and 
performance of action. SA is influenced by external factors, such as workload and system 
design, and internal factors, like goals, preconceptions and experience. The combination of 
these factors influences the consequent decision-making and the resulting action.  
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Figure 1. Model of SA in dynamic decision-making (adaptation from Endsley, 1995b). 
 
The presented model has its shortcomings. It defines SA as a product, separate from 
the process of achieving SA, nonetheless the three stages that are described in the model, e.g. 
perception, understanding and projection, are processes involved in development of SA. Thus, 
the distinction between SA as a product or a process can be vague. Further, the model is based 
on mental models, which similarly to SA is an abstract construct, making it difficult to 
operationalise and measure SA. According to Parasuraman et al. (2008), mental models 
support SA, but are a distinct construct from SA. Next, Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Jenkins, and 
Rafferty (2010) suggest that the level three – projection, can be reached without going 
through the preceding levels. The RPD model (Klein et al., 1989) can explain this objection 
where the decision-maker projects the future events based on his or her previous experience, 
even if the decision-maker cannot account for this process. Despite this critique, the three-
level model provides a comprehensible framework for measuring and accounting for the basis 
of decision-making. 
Bedny and Meister’s (1999) activity theory model represents another model of SA. 
This model combines consciousness and diverse “in-world” activities, and takes the process 
approach to SA. They propose that the extent to which information-processing methods are 
involved in achieving SA is dependent on the nature of the task and the goals of the 
individual. Furthermore, Smith and Hancock’s (1995) perceptual cycle model advocates the 
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combination of process and product approach and views SA as an “in-interaction” between 
the human and the world. Hence, this approach focuses on the dynamic nature of SA and 
merges continuous sampling of the world (process) with the updating of the world model at 
any given point in time (product).  
Although all three models appear to have some element of truth, none of them gives a 
complete explanation of SA (Sorensen, Stanton, & Banks, 2011). Endsley’s three-level model 
is so far the most developed approach, both in terms of measurement and application, despite 
some controversy about the underpinnings of the model (Stanton et al., 2001). A general 
assumption within this approach is that achieving a higher SA is the ultimate goal in all 
situations (Endsley, 1995b). 
The most frequently used measurement tools for the individual level of SA analysis 
comprise of freeze-probe techniques where the task is briefly interrupted in order to 
administrate SA related queries, and subjective rating techniques where either the task 
performer or a subject matter expert is asked to rate their own SA (see method section). 
Performance measures are also frequently used, but a number of problems concerning the 
relationship between SA and performance affect these measures. As stated by Endsley 
(1995b) “although good SA will increase the probability of good performance but cannot 
guarantee it” (p.40).  
Group-level SA. The formerly presented models represent primarily an individual 
level of analysis, with the three-level model as the most recognized so far. In group-SA 
research, no consensus exists on whether group SA is best understood as the sum of the 
individual SAs, or if a system approach is better suited where team interaction becomes 
prevalent as well. Several attempts have been made to explain group SA, but still, extensive 
debates exist around the concept, and none of the approaches includes a solid tool for 
measuring group SA (Gorman, Cooke, & Winner, 2006; Patrick & Morgan, 2010; Salmon, 
Stanton, Walker, & Green, 2006). The major approaches to group-oriented SA are team SA, 
shared SA, distributed SA, and compatible SA. The distributed SA approach has received 
most acknowledgements so far, despite its lack of proper measurement tools (Salmon et al., 
2008). 
Team and shared SA. Team SA is a multi-dimensional construct consisting of 
individual SA-contributions, whereas shared SA is the part of SA, which is overlapping 
between team members. Although it is tempting to aggregate the individual team-members’ 
SA together to provide a representation of team SA, as proposed by Kaber and Endsley 
(1998), it has been argued widely that team SA is more than the sum of its parts (Salas, 
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Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995; Salmon, Young, & Cornelissen, 2013). In order to organise 
this construct, Salas, Cooke, and Rosen (2008) suggest that team SA comprises of individual 
SA and team processes. Shared SA implies that every group member understands a given 
situation in the same manner. This approach is based on the notion that the group members 
possess “a shared mental model” which helps them to form accurate explanations and 
expectations, coordinate their actions and adapt their behaviour (Jonker, van Riemsdijk & 
Vermeulen, 2011). 
Distributed and compatible SA. Distributed SA (DSA) involves different agents, 
including non-human agents, with different views of the situation on the same scene. 
Together, it is expected that the group’s DSA is more than what individual analyses can 
account for (Stanton et al., 2006). DSA is different to team SA, and is assessed in a system 
perspective. DSA is defined as “activated knowledge for a specific task, at a specific time 
within a system” (Stanton et al., 2009, p.51). As an extension of Endsley’s three-level model, 
distributed SA sees a group as “one individual”. In this case the perception phase within one 
individual (perceive smoke) triggers the comprehension phase in a different person (call for 
emergency), which again triggers the projection phase in the last person (incident commander 
arrives and sees possible outcomes of the situation). According to Stanton et al. (2006), each 
agent within a system holds their own SA, which may be very different from, although 
compatible with, that of other agents. 
The key diﬀerence between existing team SA models (e.g. Salas et al., 1995; Endsley 
& Robertson, 2000) and the approach described by Stanton et al. (2006) relates to the issue of 
shared vs. compatible SA and the treatment of SA as a system level phenomenon. The DSA is 
considered to be something more than the sum of each individual`s SA.  
The individual measurement techniques described earlier cannot assess group level 
SA, as these focus solely on the awareness ‘in-the-head’ of an individual. The measurement 
tool that is proposed to measure DSA is propositional networks (Stanton, Salmon, Walker, 
Baber & Jenkins, 2005). This technique represents a network of information nodes and their 
interconnections based on observational or verbal transcript data of a team in action. This 
measurement method is criticised for lack of validation, lack of adequate assessment of 
individual SA processes, and restriction to only post-task measurement possibilities (Salmon 
et al., 2008). Moreover, specific software is required in order to analyse propositional 
networks.  
All of the presented models cover important aspects of SA. The two most renowned 
models are based on Endsley’s (1995b) theory of SA in dynamic systems and the distributed 
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SA-theory of Stanton et al. (2006). The former is easy to operationalise because of its discrete 
levels of SA (Kaber, Perry, Segall, McClernon, & Prinzel III, 2006), whereas the latter is 
dependent on the knowledge activated by various cognitive, behavioural and system 
components, and because of that it is difficult to operationalise and measure (Sorensen et al., 
2011).  
Next, we will turn to the review of the factors that the prevailing research claims to be 
influencing SA. 
Factors Influencing SA in Disaster Management 
Disaster management is recurrently associated with varying complex tasks (Durso, 
Rawson, & Girotto, 2007) and collaboration between different agencies (Manoj & Baker, 
2007; Smith & Dowell, 2000), both influencing individual and group SA. Poor resource 
management can be a liability in disasters where time and resources are scarce. Knowledge 
about factors that influence SA is valuable in disaster management. Following is a review of 
how ICT-use, expertise, and workload influence SA. These factors are believed to influence 
SA as either a task- and environmental factor or an internal factor, according to the three-level 
model (Endsley, 1995b). 
ICT-use.  Many different parties are required to collaborate in large-scale operations, 
such as disaster management. In emergency collaboration, most of the communication is 
bound to take place via information communication technology (ICT) as the involved 
agencies are often located over a large geographical area. ICT, such as radio or mobile 
phones, supply users with less information than face-to-face communication because the 
implicit information like body language and environmental cues are left out (Sonnenwald, 
Mclaughlin, & Whitton, 2004). Thus, SA may be positively affected by including a more 
realistic view of the situation (Endsley, 1995b). By incorporating SA in the design of ICT that 
is used in disaster management, collaboration can be more effective and efficient (Nickerson, 
2011). 
The way information is presented has a direct link to SA (Sauer et al., 2002; Thomas 
& Wickens, 2006). A pilot study found that audio transmitted information was preferred over 
graphical visualised information, as it would require too much attention to keep track of the 
monitor, but this relationship was true only in novel situations (Lancaster & Casali, 2008). 
Additionally, the design of the displays influences the achieving of SA (Sauer et al., 2002; 
Thomas & Wickens, 2006). The choice of either presenting the information visually or 
auditory is an important decision in the design of ICT.  
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Bolstad and Endsley (2003) advocate that the use of domain specific communication 
tools is the best alternative in order to support collaborative processes such as planning, 
tracking information, brainstorming, data gathering/distribution and shared SA. Domain 
specific tools are tools that are highly customized according to the specific tasks of the team 
and their information needs. Incident commanders who are not trained in using the 
appropriate ICT-devices can fall back to known behavioural patterns, resulting in utilizing 
less efficient, but familiar devices (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002). This phenomenon, 
where individual cognitive processes (either conscious or unconscious) ignore part of the 
information is referred to as heuristic decision-making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).This 
may be detrimental to team member`s SA as essential information is left out from “rational” 
decision-making. 
An important aspect is if and how the ICT-devices are used. According to Endsley 
(1995b), the ICT should promote shared understanding of the situation, e.g. team members 
who share displays with same information. On the other hand, Stanton et al. (2009) advocate 
that every person sees the situation differently; ergo ICT should reflect the individual 
variability, yet it is not clear how individual requirements can be supported by the design of 
ICT.  
The last section has presented the state of current research on SA and ICT-use. The 
emphasised aspects in relation to SA are the choice of auditory or visual stimuli use in ICT- 
design, the use of domain specific tools vs. general-purpose tools, and familiarity of the 
accessible ICT-devices.  
Expertise.  Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) show consistently higher SA scores than 
laypersons (Chauvin, Clostermann, & Hoc, 2009; Fowlkes, Salas, Baker, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Stout, 2000; Stanton et al., 2006; Stanton et al., 2009). Experimental evidence suggests that 
anticipating the consequences of actions, consistent with Endsley’s third level of SA, is 
central to pilot expertise as well as to other task domains (Doane, Sohn, & Jodlowski, 2004). 
Next, it is argued that SA is determined by a generic declarative knowledge built from 
experience (Rousseau, Tremblay, Banbury, Breton, & Guitouni, 2010). Patrick, James, 
Ahmed, and Halliday (2006) argue that poor SA scores can be interpreted as a person’s failure 
to perform the task of achieving SA satisfactorily, or a person’s lack of the necessary 
awareness or knowledge on that matter. In short, expertise of SMEs is often presented as a 
function of their knowledge and experience in their respective fields. 
Personnel working in disaster mitigation represent many types of SMEs in an 
emergency domain. A criterion for becoming an incident commander is having extensive 
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emergency response-experience (PBS 1, 2011). Both leaders and operative personnel are 
trained to acquire necessary knowledge and expertise through education and hands-on 
experience to be able to perform their job. Previous research (Eid et al., 2004) indicates that 
not only the expertise of leaders has an effect on operative personnel’s SA, but also their 
ability to lead and convey their knowledge to others, and their ability to adapt to new 
situations. 
To summarise, expertise influences the way SA is achieved. As mentioned previously, 
the individual SA construct is based on mental models, which develop over time, as the 
operator becomes more experienced in his or her domain. Consequently, emergency personnel 
with more working experience should be able to achieve a higher SA than personnel with less 
experience, with less mental workload imposed by this process. 
Workload.  One of the factors often investigated in conjunction with SA is workload, 
which is defined as “the cost of accomplishing task requirements for the human element of a 
human-machine system that may result in subjective discomfort and reductions in 
performance or physiological reactions” (Hart & Wickens, 1990). A number of researchers 
have found that the relationship between workload and SA is not straightforward (Vidulich & 
Tsang, 2012; Wickens, 2002; Wickens, 2008). Some researchers argue that a higher level of 
workload is associated with decreased SA (Alexander & Nygren, 2000; Won, Condon, 
Landon, Wang, & Hannon, 2011). On the other hand, Endsley (1993) suggests that specific 
situations can consist of high workload and high SA, as well any other combination. As 
indicated by Perry, Sheik-Nainar, Segall, Ma, and Kaber (2008) there is a workload threshold 
below which SA can be achieved effectively and consistently, and above which SA begins to 
degrade. The study advocates that some level of workload may be tolerable or even beneficial 
with respect to achieving and maintaining SA in planning tasks.  
Workload is affected by ICT-use. A performance study of aircraft pilots indicated an 
increased workload and almost perfect SA when using textual data on displays compared to 
speech alone (Lancaster & Casali, 2008). Another study found that its participants won fewer 
games with eight aiding-robots compared to only four; indicating SA loss due to increased 
workload, caused by the cognitive effort of controlling more robots and task switching 
(Squire & Parasuraman, 2010). Subsequent research has also found similar results (Chen & 
Barnes, 2012). These results indicate that more resources do not necessarily lead to less 
workload and higher SA, and that other factors are contributing to this relationship.  
Several studies have shown that there are confounding variables regarding the 
relationship between SA and workload, e.g. performance (Sebok, 2000) and level of 
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automation (Wickens, 2008). In addition, Won et al. (2011) argues that this relationship could 
be influenced by the role possessed by an individual in team-based operations. 
 
The Present Study 
The purpose of this study is to empirically test if ICT-use, expertise and workload 
influence SA in disaster management process, as proposed by the theoretical review of these 
variables. The present study is based on an emergency collaboration exercise, which took 
place in September 2013 on the South-West coast of Norway. The presentation of hypotheses 
regarding SA and the three presented factors, ICT-use (H1), expertise (H2) and workload 
(H3) will follow. 
As stated earlier, research shows that auditory ICT-devices are preferred to visual 
devices under unfamiliar or stressful situations, such as disaster management. Also, it is 
argued that a combination of both auditory and visual ICT-devices would benefit SA. 
According to these notions, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1A: Respondents who use both auditory and visual ICT-devices will have higher SA 
than respondents using only one type of device. 
Stanton et al. (2006) argues that SA is distributed across both human and non-human 
agents. More information nodes, in form of ICT, provide more information, which relieves 
human operators from remembering this information at all times. The following hypothesis 
will explore the use of multiple ICT-devices and SA: 
H1B: Use of multiple ICT-devices will be associated with higher SA than use of none 
or only one ICT-device. 
As previously discussed, Bolstad and Endsley (2003) argue that specific types of 
collaborative tools are better suited for supporting collaborative processes than others. Based 
on this, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1C: Domain specific tool-use during the exercise will be associated with higher SA 
than use of any other device. 
Previous research shows consistently that experts tend to have higher SA due to their 
extensive knowledge and experience in their domain. Emergency response workers are 
required to have adequate education and training in order to perform their job. The number of 
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years of work experience emergency personnel have in the emergency domain is assumed to 
differentiate between their expertise. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Respondents who have longer work experience in emergency response will be 
associated with higher SA. 
There is no consensus on the relationship between SA and workload, but most 
researchers seem to agree that high workload conditions would lead to degraded SA. As the 
acute phase of disaster management is often associated with high workload, the following 
hypothesis is stated: 
H3A:  Respondents who report high workload will be associated with low SA. 
At last, as previously assumed by Won et al. (2011), the role of team members may 
moderate the relationship between SA and workload. According to the emergency response 
structure (see method), the participants of the exercise can be divided into operative personnel 
and leaders, representing both tactical and operational levels. The following hypothesis will 
explore this notion: 




Data for this project was collected by two master-degree students from the Department 
of Psychology at the University of Oslo, participating in the BRIDGE-project as a part of the 
SINTEF Human-Computer Interaction team. The data was collected during observation of a 
collaboration exercise, along with after-the-fact group interviews and an online questionnaire. 
The subsequent data analysis was based on the data from the online questionnaire. 
The Collaboration Exercise 
A large collaboration exercise was arranged as a part of the BRIDGE (Bridging 
resources and agencies in large-scale emergency) project during the fall of 2013. This project 
works towards improving disaster and emergency management through developing 
technological and organisational solutions. The ultimate goal of BRIDGE is to improve the 
safety of the population by developing technical and organizational solutions that significantly 
improve disaster and emergency management in the EU Member States 
SITUATION AWARENESS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 13 
(http://www.bridgeproject.eu). The exercise was a full-scale operation where police-, fire-, 
and emergency rescue departments along with other rescue agencies and voluntary 
organisations from the Norwegian South-West coast collaborated in order to prevail fictitious 
terrorist- and explosive threats. Approximately a hundred casualties had to be attended to at 
three different locations during the exercise.  
Throughout the exercise, an advanced communication technology (ACT) designed by 
a Norwegian research organisation was applied. ACT focuses on improved information 
visualisation and interaction among central actors in the emergency response, in order to 
support their common operational picture. This is achieved by presenting three types of 
information: information about the incident, about the response, and information from 
external services. The information is then distributed across tablets, PC’s and a touch sensitive 
table situated at the incident command outpost. According to this description, ACT is a 
domain specific tool in the present emergency response. 
Emergency Response in Norway 
Emergency response agencies in Norway are organised in three levels of command: 
the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. The strategic level is 
represented by administrative executives who carry political responsibility. They make long-
term decisions, and provide guidance to the public and the participants of the response teams. 
The operational level consists of emergency centrals, which are in charge of allocating 
resources in their designated geographical area. The first responders on-site constitute the 
tactical level of command. They use their professional expertise to address the threat, 
minimise the consequences and provide immediate relief. The first responders report to their 
respective tactical leaders, which represent a connection between operational and strategic 
levels, and have a decision authority on-site. During disaster management, all three levels 
have to communicate in order to achieve common SA and effective collaboration.  
Emergency management is set to revolve around the incident command outpost (see 
figure 2). Operative personnel from each emergency department have to report to their 
respective tactical leader, who then communicates the information across the emergency 
departments. The tactical leaders are a part of the incident command outpost, and work 
together with the incident commander, who has close communication with the operational 
commander (112 – central). The appointed incident commander is usually an experienced 
police officer who has the tactical responsibility of the emergency response team on-site. 
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Figure 2. Depiction of emergency response management on-site (PBS 1, 2011). 
Preparing Data Collection 
The aim of the data collection was to achieve sufficient information regarding 
individual SA, workload, participant’s role, experience, and ICT-use during the exercise. This 
was accomplished by using the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) (Taylor, 
1990), NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 1988) and supplemental 
questions regarding the respondents’ ICT-use, years of working experience and role during 
the exercise.  
SART is a ten-item multidimensional measurement tool that is one of two validated 
SA measurement techniques (Salmon et al., 2006). It is a subjective self-reporting 
postoperative measure. The second technique is SAGAT (Endsley, 1995a), which uses a 
freeze-probe technique to measure SA during simulation exercises. SART was the preferred 
tool for measuring SA, because it has proven to be a better choice in dynamic situations 
(Salmon et al., 2009). In addition, SAGAT requires interruptions of the exercise, which was 
undesired in the present case.  
SART is based on a SA model that consists of three dimensions: demand (D), supply 
(S) and understanding (U) (Taylor, 1990), and is calculated by the equation SA = U – (D – S). 
Taylor (1990) states that SA depends on the respondent’s understanding (U) (e.g., quality and 
quantity of the information she receives) of the situation, and the difference between the 
demand (D) (e.g., complexity of operation) and the available supply (S) (e.g., ability to 
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concentrate). When demand exceeds supply, there is a negative effect on understanding and 
an overall reduction of SA. 
SART consists of ten questions that are answered on a semantic differential scale, 
ranging from 1 to 7. An example question used in the questionnaire is: “how much mental 
capacity do you have to spare in the situation? Do you have sufficient to attend to many 
variables (7) or nothing to spare at all (1)?”. 
In order to assess workload, NASA-TLX (Hart & Staveland, 1988) was chosen as it is 
the most commonly used and the most widely validated of the various tools available for 
measuring workload (Salmon et al., 2006). NASA-TLX consists of six items measuring 
different aspects of workload on a 100-points scale ranging between high and low. The 
second part of TLX intends to create individual weightings of the six subscales, which is 
performed by asking the respondents to make 15 paired comparisons between the subscales, 
based on their importance. An example of a question from NASA-TLX is: “How much time 
pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements occurred? 
Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic?” NASA-TLX is, like SART, also a 
subjective self-reporting postoperative measure. 
Adaptation of the Questionnaire 
Some alterations to the mentioned instruments were necessary in order to measure SA 
and workload efficiently at the exercise. First, SART was translated to Norwegian while a 
translated version of NASA-TLX was already available. Biographical data such as age, 
education, role, and department were included for controlling purposes during the subsequent 
analysis. The questionnaire was distributed via the web-based service EasyQuest. Due to 
formatting restrictions in EasyQuest, both SART and NASA-TLX were presented on a 
semantic differential scale, ranging from 1 to 7. Time is a limited resource for emergency 
response personnel, therefore weighting of NASA-TLX was omitted in order to minimise the 
time it took to complete the questionnaire. This choice was based on the notion of Moroney, 
Biers, Eggemeier, and Mitchell (1992) who advocate that the use of unweighted NASA-TLX 
scores is adequate when time is scarce. Please see appendix E for the full-scale version of the 
online questionnaire used in this study. 
The questions in SART refer to a specific critical situation. Due to this, a common 
critical situation during the exercise for all three emergency response departments had to be 
defined before distributing the questionnaires. This was achieved by group-interviewing 
incident- and tactical commanders from the different departments the day after the exercise. 
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The steps from a Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954, see table 1) were 
executed during the interviews. Specific probes were generated beforehand, based on the 
observation of the exercise (see appendix C). The aim of the group interviews was to achieve 
consensus between the participants about what the most critical situation actually was.  
 
Table 1 
Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan, 1954) 
Steps of Critical Incident Technique 
1. Select the incident to be analysed. 
2. Gather a description of the incident in question, from beginning to end. 
3. Construct a timeline of the incident. 
4. Select the most critical situation during the incident.  
5. Probe the selected situation with specific probes generated beforehand.  
 
The CIT technique can be used both on the individual and team level. Group 
interviews were selected in order to ensure that one specific department would not focus on 
the situations relevant for their own department, reducing subjective selection of the most 
critical situation.  
Validity and Reliability 
The SART and NASA-TLX questionnaires are acknowledged as sufficient methods 
for measuring SA and workload in previous research (Won et al., 2011). A Norwegian version 
of NASA-TLX has been previously tested in a Norwegian context (Stafseth, Karlsen, 
Langerud, & Bjørkli, manuscript in preparation). In order to improve the content validity of 
the present adaptation of the SART questionnaire, a back-translation test, according to 
Brislin’s (1970) classic back-translation model, and a pilot study were conducted. The authors 
conducted the translation from English to Norwegian and a peer student in organisational 
psychology conducted the back-translation. The results of the back-translation test indicated 
good conceptual similarity. The pilot study was completed in order to assess 
comprehensiveness of the questionnaire in Norwegian context. Some necessary linguistic 
adjustments were performed, as well as thorough instructions regarding the questionnaire 
were added  before the final distribution. 
The reliability of the questionnaire was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
Both SART and NASA-TLX alpha scores were calculated, including three subscales of 
SART, see table 2 for alpha values. Results reveal from poor but acceptable (SART), to good 
(NASA-TLX) reliability scores (George & Mallery, 2003). 
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Table 2 
Reliability scores for SART and NASA-TLX. 
Questionnaire Cronbach’s alpha 
SART  








The questionnaire was distributed using EasyQuest, an online tool for collecting data. 
A snowball-method was used to distribute the questionnaire where incident- and tactical 
command leaders from the police-, fire- and health departments distributed the questionnaire 
to their peers, personnel and superiors. This method was chosen due to e-mail address 
confidentiality restrictions in some of the responding departments. The respondents were 
provided with instructions regarding the questionnaire. The critical incident was defined as 
the first half hour after the police-, fire- and health emergency personnel arrived at the 
incident area. The questionnaire consisted of three mandatory parts: SART, NASA-TLX, and 
supplementary questions regarding the exercise. As a result, the questionnaire contained no 
missing values. Responses were collected online during a four weeks period after the exercise. 
Three e-mail and two telephone reminders were administered during this period. 
Statistical Considerations 
SART and NASA-TLX measure variables on the ordinal level. This may not comply 
with the assumptions for some of the parametric analyses performed in this study (Kuzon, 
Urbanchek, & McCabe, 1996). Nonetheless, it is commonly accepted that ordinal scales may 
be used in parametric testing, and studies have found that parametric statistics are still robust 
with respect to violations of these assumptions (Norman, 2010). The demographical questions 
were regarded as categorical for ICT-use, and as ordinal level of measurement for work 
experience.  
Three different statistical methods were used to analyse the data. The differences in 
SA with regard to the independent variables were analysed using a one-way analysis of 
variance. The relationships between SA and the predicting variables were assessed using 
regression and correlation analyses. To investigate a possible interaction, an analysis of 
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covariance was conducted using the univariate general model in SPSS. The alpha threshold of 
α =.05 was used for all analyses.   
Ethical Considerations 
Any potential negative effects of the interviews or questionnaires on the life and health 
of the respondents were considered non-existent. It was ensured that the informants were 
treated with respect, and that their integrity was preserved, in accordance with the Norwegian 
Work Environment Act. 
The participants of the focus-group interviews were informed prior to the interviews, 
both orally and in writing that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from 
the study for any reason and at any point in the study (see Appendix B). The interviewees 
were assured that the information they provided during the interview would be used only to 
assess the most critical situation during the exercise. The questionnaire respondents were 
informed about the voluntary consent, anonymity and the questionnaires accordance to the 
ethical guidelines in the invitation e-mail (see Appendix D) and again prior to the beginning 
of the questionnaire. 
This study was permitted to gather and store data connected to the BRIDGE-project 
(project number 28066), granted by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to 
SINTEF. Some information about collaboration exercise is publicly available through national 
media sources. 
Participants 
There were 55 respondents that replied to the online questionnaire. This indicates a 
response rate of approximately 51 %, based on the information provided by incident- and 
tactical commanders of each respective emergency department. The exact response rate could 
not be assessed, as there were no participant statistics available from the exercise. The sample 
consisted of 49 male and 6 female respondents from three departments: police (n = 21), fire, 
(n = 16) and emergency health department (n = 18) (see work experience distribution per 
department presented in table 3). A total of 18 respondents had a leader position during the 
exercise. Only two of these were women. The respondents’ age varied from 25 to 59 years, 
with the majority of respondents between 32 to 38 years.  
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Table 3 
Participants work experience distribution across departments. 
 
Work experience in emergency agency 
 
 0 - 3 years 4 - 7 years 8 - 11 years 12 - 15 
years 
> 15 years Total per 
department 
Police department 1 6 7 2 5 21 
Fire department 2 3 1 1 9 16 
Emergency health 
department 
0 1 6 6 5 37 
Total per category 3 10 14 9 19 55 
 
Results 
The results of the analysis on the influence of ICT-use, expertise, and workload on SA 
in the collaboration exercise will be presented next. The descriptive statistics of SA indicated 
a normal distribution, M = 18.31, SD = 6.53, and range R = 2-32.  
Testing of Hypotheses 
First, the distribution of ICT-use was explored. 47 % of the respondents used only one 
ICT-device, whereas 45 % were using either two or maximum three ICT-devices during the 
exercise. The majority (69 %) of the respondents were using radio for communication 
purposes; and 51 % of the respondents were using mobile phone. Please see total and 
overlapping use of technology in figure 3. There were 38 respondents who used only auditory 
ICT-devices, 3 respondents who used only visual devices, and 9 respondents who used both 
auditory and visual ICT-devices. There were 5 respondents who did not use any ICT-devices 
during the exercise. 
Hypothesis 1A predicted that respondents who used both auditory and visual ICT-
devices would have higher SA than respondents who used none or only one type of ICT-
devices. A one-way ANOVA analysis revealed no significant differences between 
respondents who used different types of ICT-devices (F (3, 51) = 1.853, p = .149). Which 
means that hypothesis 1A is rejected. 
Hypothesis 1B stated that the use of multiple ICT-devices would be associated with 
higher SA than the use of none or only one ICT-device. The next analysis compiled the 
number of ICT-devices used, exploring whether the number of devices used could explain the 
variance in SA. The regression analysis revealed that some of the variance in SA could be 
explained by using multiple devices (r = .274, p = .043, β = .274) during the exercise. The 
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results from exploring the ICT-usage during the exercise indicate that 7.5 % of the variance in 
SA can be explained by the number of ICT-devices used (r
2




Figure 3. Venn-diagram for technology use during the exercise. Each circle represents a different ICT-device 
that was used by the respondents. Overlapping areas indicate the percentage of respondents that used multiple 
devices. 
 
Hypothesis 1C predicted that the use of domain specific tools would yield a higher SA 
than the use of any other device during the exercise. In the present exercise advanced 
communication technology (ACT) was defined as domain specific tool. The regression 
analysis of the different ICT-devices used during the exercise and SA revealed that mobile 
phone was the only device that explained some variance in SA (r = .30, r
2
 = .09, p = .026) 
(see table 4 for a correlation matrix of all measured devices). The hypothesis 1C is rejected. 
 
Table 4 
Correlations between SA and ICT-devices that were used during the exercise. 
 
Situation Awareness Radio Mobile phone Tablet Laptop/PC ACT 
Pearson Correlation .129 .300
*
 .063 .004 -.067 
Sig. (2-tailed) .347 .026 .649 .976 .624 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Hypothesis H2 predicted that respondents who have longer work experience in 
emergency response would have higher SA. The number of years of working experience in 
the emergency response department was used as a measure of expertise. A one-way ANOVA 
analysis revealed no significant differences (F (4, 50) = .518, p = .723) between the categories 
of years of working experience in emergency agencies with respect to SA. The hypothesis H2 
is rejected. 
Hypothesis 3A stated that in disaster management SA would be associated negatively 
with workload. The present study did not yield a significant correlation between workload and 
SA (r = -.058, p = .677). As the correlation is near zero, this result is neither consistent with 
the advocates of the negative relationship between SA and workload, nor Endsley’s (1995b) 
statement of different possible relationships between these variables. The hypothesis 3A is 
rejected. 
Finally, hypothesis 3B predicted that role would be a moderating factor in the 
relationship between SA and workload, according to suggestion of Won et al. (2011). A visual 
inspection of the data concerning this relationship revealed an interaction between the 
variables (figure 4). Following the descriptive analysis of the data, role was included in the 
univariate general linear model in SPSS as an independent variable. SA was included as a 
dependent variable and workload as a covariate. The result of this analysis indicates that the 
main effect of workload on SA was not significant (F (1, 51) = 1.156, p = .29); the main 
effect of role on SA was significant in that the leaders had marginally higher SA than the 
operative personnel (F (1, 51) = 5.066, p = .03). Furthermore, there was a significant 
interaction between workload and role, (F (1, 51) = 5.500, p = .02), meaning that for leaders 
SA seems to correlate positively with workload (r = .452), while the opposite relationship 
seems to be present for operative personnel (r = -.230). The results yield added support for 
hypothesis 3B. 
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Figure 4. Visual presentation of the interaction effect between workload and role on SA. Operative personnel 
have negative relationship between SA and workload, whereas leaders have a positive relationship between the 
same variables.  
 
Discussion 
Summary and Discussion of the Results 
The purpose of the present article is to examine if ICT-use, expertise, and workload 
influence SA in disaster management. These factors represent important aspects of the three-
level model presented by Endsley (1995b) and are predicted to influence SA. Expertise is an 
individual factor while ICT-use and workload are the environmental factors that influence SA. 
Data on SA, ICT-use, expertise, and workload were gathered after a large-scale collaboration 
exercise using an online questionnaire. The measurement tools chosen to assess SA and 
workload were SART and NASA-TLX respectively. Data regarding expertise and ICT-use 
were gathered through various demographical questions.  
Hypotheses 1A-1C concern the connection between ICT-use and SA. Hypothesis 1A 
predicted that respondents who used the combination of auditory and visual ICT-devices 
would be associated with higher SA than respondents who used only one type of device. 
Hypothesis 1A did not reveal any significant results, meaning that the use of both auditory 
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and visual ICT-devices was not associated with higher SA than use of either auditory or visual 
ICT-devices alone. This result may have been affected by unequal distribution of the use of 
auditory versus visual devices during the exercise. The fact that only three respondents used 
visual ICT-devices may be attributed to the time pressure and high mobility in emergency 
management, thus making it unlikely that emergency services personnel would use visual 
ICT-devices under high stress conditions. 
The research on secondary task performance in driving indicates that tasks, which 
require visual attention, lead to more degraded performance on the primary task than auditory 
tasks (Schömig, & Metz, 2013). Following this logic, it can be assumed that the use of visual 
ICT-devices in disaster management could interfere with performance, and for this reason 
emergency personnel avoided the use of these devices. The results of Young, Salmon and 
Cornelissen (2013) indicate that visual distractions do not degrade a driver’s SA, but change 
the content of SA. The respondents from this study did not perceive less information, when 
distracted by visual stimuli, but their attention was focused on different aspects of the task. 
We argue that even if the use of both auditory and visual ICT-devices in disaster management 
is impractical due to limited spare capacity, the visual ICT-devices have the potential to direct 
emergency personnel’s attention to the relevant elements of the situation, which is beneficial 
for SA. 
The hypotheses 1B and 1C concern the environmental factors of Endsley’s (1995b) 
model and their results indicate that use of multiple ICT-devices and a mobile phone in 
particular were associated with highest SA scores. The current results support the notion 
proposed by Endsley (1995b) that task or system factors influence SA. 
Hypothesis 1B stated that respondents who used different number of ICT-devices 
during the exercise would have different levels of SA. The regression analysis showed that 
use of multiple ICT-devices during the exercise was significantly correlated with respondents’ 
SA. As the maximum number of ICT-devices used during the current exercise was three, this 
result indicates that the use of three ICT-devices was associated with higher SA than the use 
of only one ICT-device. We can assume that the relationship between number of ICT-devices 
used and SA is not linear, e.g. the use of ten ICT-devices would not yield the same result. It is 
evident that the use of multiple ICT-devices will benefit SA only up to some extent. 
Thereafter, it may be expected that the workload of managing multiple devices would 
outperform the utility of these devices. We can expect a U-formed relationship between 
number of ICT-devices and SA. Endsley (1995b) states that less communication between the 
team members is needed in order to achieve higher SA, if the members have a shared mental 
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model. This means that such teams would be able to obtain higher SA without the use of ICT-
devices. As emergency responders are often spread across large geographical areas, the use of 
ICT is an inevitable prerequisite of communication in disaster management. Following this 
notion, we argue that this finding indicates that information needs of the responders in order 
to achieve sufficient SA were not covered by the functions of one specific ICT-device. This 
lead responders to use multiple ICT-devices. This view is consistent with the conclusion of 
the evaluation committee of the exercise, which points out that the ICT used during the 
exercise lacks sufficient functionality and capacity (Breivoll, 2014, p.3). 
Hypothesis 1C predicted that use of domain specific tools during the exercise would 
be associated with higher SA than use of any other ICT-device. As proposed by Bolstad and 
Ensdsley (2003), the domain specific tools are tailored to the specific information needs of the 
people who use them. The present study defined ACT as the domain specific tool, as it was 
designed to support SA of the emergency services’ personnel and facilitate decision making 
of incident and tactical commanders. Additionally, radio could also be defined as a domain 
specific tool because it is the preferred ICT-tool in emergency response, defined by the 
National Police Directorate (2013). Neither use of ACT or radio during the exercise was 
associated with higher SA. This result may indicate that the use of domain specific tools has 
no connection to SA in disaster management. Other possible explanations will be discussed 
below. 
There were only four incident and tactical commanders that used ACT during the 
exercise, which could explain why the use of ACT did not influence SA. On the contrary, 69 
% of the respondents used the radio. The use of radio provides auditory information gathering 
and distribution, which is transcribed by the operators at the operational centrals. Visual 
display of this information is available for every responder who has the access to the 
operational log of the event. According to the previously mentioned notion from the National 
Police Directorate (2013), radio should be the preferred choice for efficient information 
distribution. This may not be the case with information inquiries. Respondents indicated that 
certain inquiries on the radio had to be repeated several times before they got an answer, 
besides several respondents referred to a radio breakdown during the exercise. As long as 
technological breakdowns occur, there is a need for backup solutions, e.g. use of multiple 
ICT-tools. 
Further, as indicated by the current results, the use of mobile phone was the only ICT-
device that yielded a positive correlation with SA. It is likely that information inquiries were 
done by use of mobile phones, as this device allows a fast, direct one-to-one communication. 
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In addition, the mobile phone is a familiar device to most people, which may explain why it 
was used in the stressful environment of disaster management. This is consistent with the 
earlier discussion on heuristic decision-making. Additionally, this finding may indicate that 
the emergency responders perceive mobile phone as a more reliable communication tool than 
any other ICT. The radio breakdown may also have contributed to the fact that those 
respondents who did use the mobile phone perceived their SA to be higher than those 
respondents who did not have the opportunity to replace radio with other ICT-devices. The 
use of the mobile phone as a communication tool in a disaster management has limitations. It 
is basically a one-to-one communication tool, which requires the knowledge of whom to call. 
Communication in disaster management based on personal connections is incapable to utilize 
all available resources. Not engaging spare resources in disaster management has repeatedly 
been pointed out as a weakness in previous post-disaster reports (St.meld. nr. 21. 2012-2013). 
The previous passages discussed the results of hypotheses 1A to 1C. These results 
indicate that use of multiple ICT-devices is beneficial for SA; either it is based on the need for 
multiple functions, or the necessity for backup solutions in case of ICT breakdown. Further, 
customized communication tools, such as ACT, may have the potential to benefit SA of 
emergency personnel by combining auditory and visual stimuli, if these tools are familiar and 
used for both small accidents and full-scale emergencies. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns an individual factor of Endsley`s (1995b) three-level model - 
expertise. Expertise was operationalised as years of working experience in the emergency 
department. This hypothesis predicted that respondents with longer work experience in 
emergency response would have higher SA scores, but was rejected. This is in contrast to the 
three-level model, among other studies on SMEs and SA (Chauvin et al., 2009; Fowlkes et al., 
2000; Stanton et al., 2006). Three possible explanations to this will be provided. 
First, the expertise variable was based on how many working years in an emergency 
department each respondent reported, and then testing for the difference in level of SA 
between the categories of working years. The majority of the respondents reported to have 
more than three years of work experience. This indicates that the population in the present 
sample was homogeneous, which may explain why no differences were found. Second, it may 
be speculated that the measured variables were not sensitive enough in order to capture 
differences in respondents’ expertise. However, the study of Selcon, Taylor and Koritsas 
(1991) indicate that SART shows an added utility to detect effects when respondents’ 
experience is an independent variable, like in the this study. 
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Third, it may be that other individual variables than years of working experience are 
responsible for the variance in SA during disaster management. These may include, e.g. 
specific personality traits of the respondents, which are not accounted for in the three-level 
model. Previous research on hazard detection (Underwood, Ngai & Underwood, 2013) 
discovered that there were no differences in SA due to experience, if the hazard was abrupt. In 
case of gradual-onset hazards, more experienced respondents had higher SA than the novices. 
As the acute phase in disaster management is often an abrupt disruption, this could explain 
why no difference in SA was found due to experience. In sum, this finding may be an 
indication that the task or system factors were more important than the individual factors for 
achieving SA during the present exercise. Based on the magnitude of expertise’s prominence 
in previous research (see theory); we argue that expertise still is a crucial factor for higher SA 
levels. 
Hypothesis 3A predicted that there would be a negative correlation between SA and 
workload during the acute phase of the exercise. An ongoing debate revolves around the 
relationship between these variables. The results of this study did not reveal a negative 
correlation between SA and workload, which is commonly found in previous research 
(Mouloua, Gilson, Kring & Hancock. 2001). Moreover, several studies indicate that SART 
and NASA-TLX may measure the same overlapping constructs (Hendy, 1995, Selcon, Taylor 
& Koritsas, 1991). Advocates of this perspective claim that SART subscales supply and 
demand measure the workload imposed by the situation. On the other hand, Parasuraman, 
Sheridan and Wickens (2008) resolve this debate by concluding that both SA and workload 
are distinct and viable constructs that are valuable in understanding and predicting human-
system performance in complex systems. This is in accordance with Endsley’s (1993) 
conclusion that SA and workload may interact under certain conditions, but behave 
independently in others. The latter study suggests searching for confounding variables, which 
may explain why favourable (high SA and low workload) or unfavourable (high SA and high 
workload) combinations of these variables arise. Since the correlation was not significant, the 
results may support the notion that SA and workload are two separate constructs with varying 
inter-relations. It is acknowledged that the sample size and a potential overlapping of the 
measurement tools may have contributed to camouflaging this relationship. Nonetheless, it is 
emphasized that the present results do not yield added support to the existence of the negative 
correlation between SA and workload. 
Hypothesis 3B predicted that respondents’ role during the exercise would influence 
the relationship between SA and workload. It was found that role significantly moderates this 
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relationship. A leader’s role was associated with a positive correlation between SA and 
workload. On the other hand, the role of operative personnel was associated with a negative 
correlation between the same variables. This is consistent with the suggestions that Won et al. 
(2011) made based on their research on SA and workload. There are three proposed 
explanations to the present interaction effect.  
First, it may be argued that leaders function as information hubs. Leaders tended to use 
multiple types of ICT-devices and as a result had access to more information that was 
communicated than the operative personnel did during the exercise. This may have given 
leaders the opportunity to understand more of what was going on. As stated earlier, handling 
multiple ICT-devices can lead to information and workload overload (Squire & Parasuraman, 
2010), but in the present study leaders seemed to be unaffected by this during the exercise, 
and managed to maintain a high SA despite an increase in workload. On the other hand, it 
may seem that the operative personnel had access to less information than leaders and 
therefore could not maintain high SA. As noted by Gorman, Cooke and Winner (2006), not 
everyone in the team has to be aware of the same information. Rather, it is more important to 
ensure that the right information reaches the right person at the right time, in this way creating 
a compatible system that supports DSA. 
Second, this finding may indicate that leaders have more experience and better 
developed mental models of the situation, due to their specific experience in the leader role 
and not their working experience in general. This may indicate that leader experience is 
qualitatively different from the general emergency experience. This suggestion is consistent 
with the RPD model (Klein et al., 1989), which suggests that experts develop intuition that is 
difficult for them to verbalize, however it plays a crucial role in achieving higher levels of 
SA. This qualitative difference in general and leader experience was not captured by the 
present questionnaire. Moreover there could be other individual variables than expertise that 
influence this relationship, e.g. personality of leaders, or the recruitment process of 
emergency leaders that accounts for many of these individual factors. 
Finally, the present result may indicate that leaders are more biased in judging their 
own performance, hence reporting a higher SA under high workload conditions. As observed 
during the exercise and preparatory emergency sit-ins, incident- and tactical commanders 
have lots of authority and are concerned about having and projecting that they have full 
control of the situation regardless the circumstances. On that account, they may be less prone 
to admit lower SA during the most acute phases of disaster management. 
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In conclusion, the results of the hypothesis 3B provide an important contribution to 
workload-SA debate, suggesting that role moderates this relationship in emergency 
management. This finding may be applicable to other domains as well, as the role of 
confounding variables was suggested by research in other domains than disaster management. 
Future research should investigate this effect further. Possible practical implications affect the 
use of ICT and other support tools for decision-making. 
General Discussion 
Disaster management is a highly complex task with many varying factors, and an 
understanding of what’s going on is a crucial component that influences the decision making 
of the emergency personnel. As previously outlined, although SA is not essential for 
performance, it does increase the probability for successful disaster mitigation. This study has 
investigated if ICT-use, expertise and workload influenced SA in a Norwegian collaboration 
exercise. Next, the general discussion regarding the findings of this study will follow. 
As stated previously in the theory section, SA can be regarded as either an individual 
phenomenon, according to Endsley (1995b), or as a group-level phenomenon as proposed by 
Stanton et al. (2009). In the present study, the measurement tools assessed SA on an 
individual level. However, SA may also be accounted as something that is distributed across 
team members. The next two implications of the findings will be discussed in the light of both 
the individual and distributed level of SA analysis.  
The first implication concerns the use of ICT-devices in disaster management. This 
study suggests that focus on ICT-device use and design may be beneficial for SA. Thus, 
adapting technology to the information needs of emergency personnel and adequate training 
in their use is beneficial in disaster mitigation. On the other hand, a group-level approach 
proposed by Stanton et al. (2009) suggests that SA should be viewed as a systems 
phenomenon. According to this approach, shared SA is not possible to achieve because every 
person would experience the same situation differently; disaster mitigation would benefit 
from focus on distributed and compatible SA, e.g. adapting ICT to individual information 
requirements that are compatible with those of the other team members. 
According to the individual level of analysis, the focus should be on creating shared 
SA amongst emergency personnel, e.g. via ICT. Distribution of information should take all 
the individuals working in disaster management into account, providing them with rich and 
relevant information about the incident. From the group-perspective, it may be speculated that 
ICT used in the current exercise have fulfilled its purpose sufficiently. The emergency 
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personnel used appropriate ICT-devices according to their task requirements, but did not 
achieve high SA regarding the acute phase of the exercise as a total. Regardless if SA is 
assessed according to Endsley or Stanton, the conclusion is that ICT is an important factor in 
disaster management. Whether the redesign of currently available ICT is needed, is dependent 
on the level of analysis of SA.  
The second implication concerns workload and SA. It was found that leaders and 
operative personnel respond differently to high workload conditions concerning SA. These 
results imply that leaders may be capable of maintaining high SA during high workload 
conditions, and can therefore handle more information via multiple ICT-devices than the 
operative personnel are able to. The evaluation report of the exercise (Breivoll, 2014) stated 
that there were major challenges in establishing and distributing shared SA (p.3). This 
statement can be attributed to the use of ICT discussed previously, or to the lack of 
coordination on the higher decision level, e.g. incident- and tactical commanders (Breivoll, 
2014, p.11). The report states that operative personnel is required to report relevant 
information about the incident to their respective commanders, and the personnel of the 
incident command outpost is responsible for distributing information in order to support 
shared SA of all involved parties. Considering the information flow scheme, the current 
results indicate that information failure occurred at leaders’ level. Leaders in the present 
exercise, which succeeded in achieving high SA, failed to support shared SA in operative 
personnel. On the individual level of SA, the results suggest that extra resources are needed in 
order to achieve a higher SA for operative personnel. If the results are considered on the 
group-level of analysis, it may indicate that SA is indeed distributed across different team 
members, but it is the leaders who need to support their SA, and techniques for distributing 
their insights of what’s going on to the operative personnel. 
Limitations 
This study has certain limitations when it comes to the SA concept, the measurement, 
the interview and the chosen critical situation, and the respondents of the questionnaire. Next, 
how these limitations may have affected the results will be discussed. 
The concept.  The first limitation concerns the concept of SA. As stated earlier, SA is 
an abstract construct, which is defined differently according to the theoretical foundation of 
the concept and according to the level of analysis (individual or group). This makes it difficult 
to conclude if the respondents in the present study had an overall good or poor SA, or to 
establish an “optimal” SA that should be strived to attain.  
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Measurement.  SART and NASA-TLX are post-operative subjective measures of SA 
and workload respectively. The questionnaires, which are executed after-the-fact, are 
vulnerable to respondents’ decay in memory. The participants were prompted to complete the 
questionnaire as soon as possible after the exercise, in order to minimise this effect. The data 
may also have been biased due to social desirability of its respondents, or the mere fact that 
introspecting oneself regarding SA is a difficult task, which is not accurately reflected in the 
questionnaire. These limitations need to be taken into account when assessing the results of 
the current study.  
Despite the consensus in the academic circles, that DSA is a better alternative for 
assessing SA in teams (Stanton et al., 2009) due to sounder theoretical base than the three-
level model (Endsley, 1995b), the propositional networks measurement tool does not enable 
contrasting SA of different teams. This tool provides a qualitative assessment of team’s SA 
and describes the framework for analysing collaborative activities in the specific case. On the 
contrary, the three-level model defines a specific system and individual factors that can be 
assessed and improved in order to increase individual SA. 
The interview and the critical situation.  Two limitations exist regarding the focus 
group interview and the critical situation established during the interview. First, the 
interviewees’ lack of emergency response experience may have influenced the probe 
questions that were asked during the interview. A sit-in at the emergency response unit in 
Oslo prior to the focus group interview was conducted in order to achieve sufficient 
understanding regarding the topic.  
The second limitation concerns the specific situation that was required for both SART 
and NASA-TLX (see method). The investigated exercise lasted several hours, and consisted 
of many different situations. The respondents were asked to focus on the first half hour after 
the incident occurred, as this was defined as the most critical phase during the exercise by the 
focus group interviews. This may have biased the data, as several of the respondents were 
located in different geographical areas and situations during this time. As stated by Endsley 
(1995b), SA is temporal in nature such that SA is built up over time. Although it is difficult to 
define the specific details that the operator needs to perceive and understand, there are 
relevant elements that are common for multiple persons in the explored situation. Thus 
focusing on the timeframe instead of the geographical location gave the respondents 
possibility to focus on the shared elements of the situation. 
Respondents.  The sampling for the current study was not done randomly. For 
practical reasons, contact persons in each emergency department did the selection of the 
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participants. A list of all participants in the collaboration exercise and their contact 
information was not available. There is a reason to believe that an invitation to the 
questionnaire was distributed only to certain emergency responders through the snowball 
method, suggesting a possibly biased sample.  
In conclusion, even if this study had various limitations, measures have been taken in 
order to minimize the negative consequences. 
 
Conclusion 
SA is an important aspect in disaster management. The results from this study provide 
support that individual oriented SA is influenced by ICT and workload during a crisis 
scenario. Consequently, the results yield an added support to the notion that environmental 
factors influence SA, according to the three-level model of SA (Endsley, 1995b). In order to 
improve SA in disaster management, it is important to focus on the use of the right ICT 
according to the role’s information requirements. ICT should be a familiar and reliable source 
of communication. Additionally, leaders seem to be able to maintain high SA under high 
workload conditions, unlike the operative personnel. Thus, the role of the emergency 
personnel during disaster management imposes different requirements to information 
distribution and use of ICT. 
The present research points out practical and theoretical implications for how ICT 
should be used during large-scale disasters, and to the understanding of the relationship 
between SA and workload, differentiated by role. Further research on the topic should 
combine individual and group-level approach to SA in order to gain better understanding of 
the concept in a dynamic environment. 
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Informasjonsskriv til intervjudeltagere 
 
BRIDGE er et EU-finansiert forskningsprosjekt som hadde oppstart våren 2011. Formålet med 
prosjektet er å øke sikkerheten i samfunnet gjennom utvikling av tekniske og organisatoriske 
løsninger for forbedret krisehåndtering og beredskap. Hovedfokus i prosjektet er utviklingen av 
løsninger som understøtter og frembringer samarbeid mellom aktører på det tekniske og 
organisatoriske nivå. Et viktig ledd i BRIDGE er derfor å forstå hva slags informasjon som blir 
produsert i krisesituasjoner, hvordan folk genererer, deler og lager mening ut av denne 
informasjonen, og hvordan disse prosessene kan bli bedre understøttet i fremtiden. For mer 
informasjon om BRIDGE-prosjektet, se http://www.bridgeproject.eu/. 
 
I forbindelse med BRIDGE-prosjektet ønsker SINTEF, samt to masterstudenter tilknyttet prosjektet, å 
intervjue deltagere fra øvelsen. Studentene, Jørgen Ernstsen og Daniela Villanger som studerer 
arbeids- og organisasjonspsykologi ved Universitetet i Oslo, skal skrive sine oppgaver om 
situasjonsbevissthet i  krisesituasjoner og har fått tillatelse til å observere Øvelse Risavika 2013 i 
Stavanger, med oppstart onsdag 25. september 2013. Det ønskes å observere ved å ta notater og 
stille spørsmål under øvelsen (så langt det ikke forstyrrer arbeidet til involverte parter under 
øvelsen), for så å gjennomføre intervjuer i ettertid av øvelsen. Deretter vil det sendes ut 
spørreskjemaer til operativt personell i løpet av påfølgende måned. Innsamlet datamateriale vil 
analyseres for å kartlegge deltagernes situasjonsbevissthet under øvelsen. SINTEF ønsker videre å 
bruke datamaterialet studentene får tilgang til i forbindelse med BRIDGE-prosjektet. 
 
Vi gjør oppmerksom på at deltakelse er frivillig, og at alle operatører og andre som er til stede har 
rett til å ikke delta eller trekke seg når som helst, uten å måtte oppgi noen grunn for dette. Alle 
involverte har også rett til å be om at lydopptaker blir stoppet/startet, samt om å slette deler av 
lydopptaket hvis dette er ønskelig. 
 
Alt datamaterialet vil bli behandlet konfidensielt i overensstemmelse med det Europeiske 
databeskyttelsesdirektivet (95/46/EF 1998). Prosjektet har blitt meldt inn til den Norske 
Samfunnsvitenskapelige Datatjeneste (NSD), personvernombudet for forskning i Norge og er 
godkjent med referanse 28066. Merk at personopplysninger vil bli behandlet strengt fortrolig og kun 
vil bli delt mellom BRIDGE-medlemmer tilknyttet SINTEF. Datamaterialet vil bli anonymisert før bruk i 
analyser. Innsamlet data vil bli oppbevart på-, og delt gjennom sikre serverløsninger, og tilgang til 
anonymisert data vil kun bli gitt til medlemmer av BRIDGE prosjektet. Under ingen omstendigheter 
vil tilgang til den innsamlete data gis til utenforstående som ikke er involvert i prosjektet. Data vil bli 
SINTEF IKT 
Postadresse: 
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anonymisert før bruk i analyser, rapporter, publikasjoner, presentasjoner, samt i de to 
masteroppgavene, slik at det ikke inneholder noen opplysninger som kan identifisere enkeltpersoner. 
I noen tilfeller kan publikasjoner og presentasjoner gjøre bruk av anonymiserte sitater. Ved 
prosjektslutt i 2015 vil personidentifiserbar data bli slettet. Anonymisert data kan beholdes på 
ubestemt tid. 
 
Hvis dere har spørsmål, vennligst kontakt prosjektleder Jan Håvard Skjetne per e-post 
(jan.h.skjetne@sintef.no) eller telefon (22067871 / 93409191). 
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
 
Ida Maria Haugstveit 
SINTEF ICT 
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Appendix B: Consent Form 
  
European Commission 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-SEC-2010-1) 
 SEC-2010.4.2-1: Interoperability of data, 





      Bridging Resources and Agencies in Large-Scale Emergency  Management 
 
Samtykkeskjema for deltagelse i EU prosjektet BRIDGE 
Ved å signere dette skjemaet bekrefter du at du har mottatt informasjon om prosedyrene og detaljer 
rundt prosjektet, at du har fått tilstrekkelig mulighet til å vurdere denne informasjonen, og at du 
frivillig vil delta i prosjektet. Du vil motta en kopi av dette samtykkeskjema. 
□  Jeg bekrefter at jeg har lest og forstått informasjonen i skrivet “Informasjonsskriv til 
intervjudeltagere”, datert 3.september 2013. 
□ Jeg har hatt muligheten til å vurdere denne informasjonen, og fått tilfredsstillende svar på 
spørsmål vedrørende forskningen. 
□ Jeg sier meg villig til å delta i forskningsprosjektet og forstår at min deltakelse er frivillig. 
□ Jeg forstår at jeg når som helst kan trekke meg som deltaker, uten å matte oppgi noen grunn 
for dette.  
□ Jeg tillater at mine svar blir tatt opp på lydbånd. 
□ Jeg er innforstått med at informasjonen jeg gir kan bli delt med medlemmer av 
prosjektet, og brukt i rapporter, presentasjoner, og andre publikasjoner. 
□ Jeg er innforstått med at informasjonen jeg gir vil bli behandlet konfidensielt av alle 
forskerne. 
□ Jeg forstår at all data som samles inn vil bli behandlet anonymt. 
 
Vennligst signer på baksiden av arket 
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SIGNATUR til deltaker: _______________________     
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Appendix C: Critical Incident Technique Procedure 
 
Steg 1: Velg kritisk hendelse, som i  vår tilfelle blir samarbeidsøvelsen.  
 
Steg 2: Samle inn informasjon om samarbeidsøvelsen.  
- Ber deltagere i fokusgruppen å beskrive øvelsen Risavika 2013. Beskrivelsen bør inneholde 
informasjon om hva som førte til situasjonen, detaljert beskrivelse av episode under øvelsen 
og beskrivelse av utfallet for hver nevnte episode. 
Suksesskriterier: Noterer alle nevnte situasjoner, rik beskrivelse for hele øvelsen, ingen av deltagere 
har noe å tilføye mer. 
 
Steg 3: Lage tidslinje sammen med fokus-gruppen 
- Gå gjennom beskrivelse i steg 2 for å supplere hver episode med tidsaspekt og varighet, evt. 
andre tilhørende episoder. Fokus på både fysiske hendelser, mentale prosesser og 
persepsjon av hver episode. 
Suksesskriterier: Gå gjennom hver notert situasjon og supplere med tid og varighet. Spørre om 
fysiske, mentale prosesser under hver situasjon. Få deltagere til å reflektere over hva som egentlig 
skjedde. Noter hva de legger vekt på. 
 
Steg 4: Velge ut spesifikke episoder som kan granskes videre 
- Sammen med fokus-gruppen velge episoden som oppfattes som mest kritisk/avgjørende 
under hele øvelsen. En slik episode bør omfatte alle involverte enheter på alle nivåer. 
Etablere felles tidsramme som alle enheter kan assosiere episoden med. 
Suksesskriterier: Få deltagere til å bli enige om en situasjon som var mest kritisk for alle involverte. 
Notere kriterier de bruker for å velge den mest kritiske hendelsen. Er kriteriene like for alle? 
 
Steg 5: Stille spesifikke spørsmål i forhold til den valgte situasjonen  
- Hva slags teknologiske hjelpemidler brukte du under denne situasjonen? 
- Kan du fortelle litt om de tilgjengelige teknologiske hjelpemidlene? (fordeler + ulemper) 
- Hvilke andre enheter/hvem samarbeidet du med? 
- Kan du beskrive hva som førte til denne situasjonen? 
- Har du vært i en lignende hendelse før? 
- Hva var din viktigste informasjonskilde? 
- Hvordan vurderer du mengde og kvalitet på tilgjengelig informasjon? 
- Hva var det du eller andre gjorde som var særlig effektivt/ineffektivt under situasjonen? 
- Hva var utfallet av dine handlinger? 
- Hvorfor det du gjorde var effektivt? 
- Hva annet kunne blitt forventet i en slik situasjon? 
- Hvordan har denne øvelsen vært i forhold til reelle krisesituasjoner? 
 
- Ulike kategorier av jobbnivå, f.eks. ledere og operativ personell; finnes det flere? 
- Utdanningskategorier på tvers av etater: høyskole/universitet, fagskole/fagbrev, kurs, andre? 
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Appendix D: E-mail with the Link to Questionnaire 
ØVELSE RISAVIKA 2013 - SPØRREUNDERSØKELSE 
  
I forbindelse med øvelsen Risavika 2013 gjennomføres det en spørreundersøkelse om deltagernes 
forståelse og tolkning av ulike situasjoner under øvelsen (deltagernes situasjonsbevissthet). Dette er 
en del av EU-prosjektet BRIDGE som handler om samarbeidet på tvers av etater og landegrenser ved 
større ulykker. Undersøkelsen er anonym og underlagt internasjonale etiske retningslinjer.  
  





Ditt bidrag er viktig for videreutvikling av samhandling og kommunikasjon mellom nødetatene. 
Vi takker for at du tar deg tid til å gjennomføre spørreundersøkelsen. 
  
   
Vennlig hilsen,  
  
Jørgen Ernstsen og Daniela Villanger 
Masterstudenter i arbeids- og organisasjonspsykologi 
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Appendix E: EasyQuest Questionnaire 
 




I undersøkelsen blir det gjennomgående referert til en spesifikk situasjon under øvelsen. Situasjonen 
det refereres til er den første halvtimen etter at brann- politi- og helsepersonell ankom skadestedet 
for sikring av området, skadde og eventuelle terrorister. Ta utgangspunkt i hvor du befant deg eller 
hva du gjorde i dette aktuelle tidsrommet.  
 
Det er viktig at du fokuserer kun på denne definerte situasjonen, og i den grad det er mulig ikke lar 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Stabilitet under situasjonen: Var situasjonen stabil og 
grei eller var den ustabil med raske endringer? 
1 = stabil og 7 = ustabil 
       
Kompleksitet i situasjonen: Var situasjonen enkel og 
"rett frem" eller hadde den mange ulike komponenter? 
1 = enkel og 7 = komplisert 
       
Variasjon i situasjonen: Var det få faktorer som endret 
seg under situasjonen eller var det mange faktorer som 
var i endring? 
1 = få endringer og 7 = mange endringer 
       
Emosjonell aktivering: Hadde du lav grad av årvåkenhet 
eller var du våken og klar for handling? 
1 = lite aktivert og 7 = veldig aktivert  
       
Konsentrasjon: Konsentrerte du deg om kun ett moment 
ved situasjonen eller konsentrerte du deg om flere 
momenter? 
1 = fullt konsentrert om ett moment og 7 = konsentrert 
om mange momenter 
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Delt oppmerksomhet: Var du fullt oppmerksom på ett 
aspekt ved situasjonen eller var du oppmerksom på flere 
aspekter? 
1 = oppmerksom på ett aspekt og 7 = oppmerksom på 
flere aspekter 
       
Ledig mental kapasitet: Hadde du ingen ledig mental 
kapasitet til overs eller hadde du ledig kapasitet til å 
ivareta mange momenter ved situasjonen? 
1 = ingen ledig mental kapasitet og 7 = ledig mental 
kapasitet 
       
Informasjonsmengde: Mottok du lite informasjon eller 
mye informasjon om situasjonen? 
1 = lite informasjon og 7 = mye informasjon 
       
Informasjonskvalitet: Var mottatt informasjon 
uoversiktlig og mangelfull eller var den utfyllende og 
detaljert? 
1 = uoversiktlig/mangelfull og 7 = utfyllende/detaljert 
       
Kjennskap til situasjonen: Var situasjonen helt ny eller 
har du mye relevant erfaring med lignende situasjoner? 
1 = ny situasjon og 7 = mye relevant erfaring 
       
Hvor mentalt og perseptuelt krevende var situasjonen?  
1 = meget lav og 7 = meget høy        
Hvor fysisk krevende var situasjonen?  
1 = ikke belastende og 7 = meget belastende        
Hvor stort tidspress opplevde du under situasjonen?  
1 = god tid og 7 = lite tid        
Hvor hardt anstrengte du deg under situasjonen?  
1 = lite og 7 = mye        
Hvor høyt var ditt frustrasjonsnivå under situasjonen?  
1 = meget lavt og 7 = meget høyt        
Hvor bra mener du at du klarte oppgaven i henhold til 
instruksene?  
1 = dårlig prestasjon og 7 = god prestasjon 
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DEL 2 
Generell informasjon og biografiske data 
 
Hvor kritisk vurderer du den nevnte situasjonen? 
  Ikke kritisk 
  Lite kritisk 
  Ganske kritisk 
  Vedig kritisk 
 
Er det en annen situasjon du vurderer som mer kritisk? 
  Nei, undersøkelsens situasjonen var den mest kritiske 
 Ja, det er en annen situasjon som var mer kritisk. Hvilken?  
 
Hvis ja, hvor kritisk var denne situasjonen? 
  Jeg svarte nei, undersøkelsens nevnte situasjonen var den mest kritiske 
  Ikke kritisk 
  Lite kritisk 
  Ganske kritisk 
  Veldig kritisk 
 
Hvor gammel er du? 
  18 - 24 år 
  25 - 31 år 
  32 - 38 år 
  39 - 45 år 
  46 - 52 år 
  53 - 59 år 
  60 - 66 år 
  Mer enn 67 år 
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Hva er ditt kjønn? 
  
 
Høyeste fullførte utdanning 
  
Hvilken etat jobber du i? 
  Politi 
  Brann 
  Helse 
 Annet, spesifiser her:  
 
Hvor mange år har du jobbet i denne etaten? 
  0 - 3 år 
  4 - 7 år 
  8 - 11 år 
  12 - 15 år 
  Mer enn 15 års erfaring 
 
Under øvelsen Risavika 2013, i hvilken rolle deltok du i øvelsen? 
  Lederrolle (innsatsleder, fagleder, teamleder eller lignende) 
  Operativt personell (politibetjent, beredskapstroppen, sykepleier, brannmann eller lignende) 
  Sykehuspersonell 
  Nødsentral (112, 113, 110, LRS, HRS) 
 Annet, spesifiser her:  
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Hvor mange års erfaring har du med lederansvar? 
  Har ikke hatt lederansvar 
  0 - 3 år 
  4 - 7 år 
  8 - 11 år 
  Mer enn 12 år med lederansvar 
 
Under øvelsen, hvilke andre etater hadde du direkte samarbeid med? 
  Helse (inkl. AMK-sentralen) 
  Brann (inkl. 110-sentralen) 
  Politi (inkl. Operasjonsentralen) 
 Annet, spesifiser her:  
 
Hvilke teknologiske hjelpemidler benyttet du for kommunikasjon?  
  Nødradio/samband 
  Mobiltelefon 
  Tablet/nettbrett 
  Laptop/PC 
  MASTER-table eller andre MASTER-applikasjoner 
 Annet, spesifiser her:  
 
 Har du deltatt på en samhandlingsøvelse før? 
  Ja 
  Nei 
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Hvor fornøyd er du med læringsutbytte av øvelsen? 
  Veldig misfornøyd 
  Litt misfornøyd 
  Fornøyd 
  Ganske fornøyd 
  Veldig fornøyd 
 
Hvordan opplevde du øvelsen Risavika 2013 i forhold til reelle hendelser? 
  Ikke realistisk 
  Lite realistisk 
  Ganske realistisk 
  Veldig realistisk 
 
Hvor mye visste du om øvelsen på forhånd? 
  Nesten alt 
  Jeg visste min rolle og arbeidsoppgaver i øvelsen 
  Jeg visste om øvelsen, men ikke om jeg kom til å være med 
  Jeg visste ikke om øvelsen 
 Annet, spesifiser her:  
 
Har du noen kommentarer om øvelsen Risavika 2013? Dine kommentarer er viktige for 
evalueringen av denne øvelsen og planlegging av videre samhandlingsøvelser. 
 
